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I. INTRODUCTION
In October, 1985, Margaret Randall, an American-born poet and
feminist writer who had become a Mexican citizen, was denied per-
manent residency in the United States and subsequently was ordered
deported' by the district director of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) in El Paso, Texas, because "her Writings go far
beyond mere dissent."' 2 The Immigration and Nationality (McCar-
ran-Walter) Act of 19523 authorized the district director to exercise
discretion to prevent this internationally known author from remain-
ing with her family in America4 and from participating in the national
political dialogue. The McCarran-Walter Act, a product of the anti-
communist fervor of the McCarthy era,5 provides for the exclusion or
deportation of noncitizens whom the Attorney General or consular
1. See Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Although Margaret
Randall was born in the United States, she subsequently gave up United States citizenship in
1966 when she became a resident and citizen of Mexico. See id.
2. Id. at 487. The assertion that an author's writings go "beyond mere dissent"
fallaciously suggests that dissent must be mild or moderate in order to be acceptable.
3. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C §§ 1101-1503 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
4. See Randall, 854 F.2d at 476.
5. An example of the paranoia that characterized the McCarthy era is the Emergency
Detention Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 811 (1950) (repealed 1971)- one of the precursors to the
McCarran-Walter Act-which declared:
There exists a world Communist movement which in its origins, its development,
and its present practice, is a world-wide revolutionary movement whose purpose
it is, by treachery, deceit, infiltration into other groups (goyernmental and
otherwise), espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and any other means deemed
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officer determines to be Communists or subversives, and whose pres-
ence in the United States therefore may be contrary to the public
interest.6
In promulgating the McCarran-Walter Act, Congress exercised
its plenary power under the Constitution to regulate the admission
and deportation of aliens in the interest of international relations and
defense.7 Because Congress implements this plenary power through
the executive branch, the judiciary has been reluctant to intervene,
not only in congressional policymaking, but also in executive imple-
mentation of that policy.8 Therefore, the judiciary has been unwilling
to address fully the negative impact on free association and the free
flow of ideas inherent in the McCarran-Walter Act, a law designed to
close the borders and to forbid entry to persons on the basis of their
affiliations and ideology. Although Congress subsequently has
attempted to moderate the restrictive effects on personal freedoms
engendered by the McCarran-Walter Act, this effort has met with
limited success.9 Because Congress has failed to provide legislation
that would protect the national borders without infringing on individ-
necessary, to establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship in all the countries
of the world through the medium of a world-wide Communist organization.
ld.
6. 8 U.S.C. § i182(a)(27)-(29) (1982). In order to be granted relief from exclusion, the
alien must prove "to the satisfaction of the consular officer" that he should not be excluded. Id.
§ 1182(a)(28)(I). This delegation of authority is both extensive without definitive outline.
7. Congress declared:
The power and authority of the United States, as an attribute of sovereignty,
either to prohibit or regulate immigration of aliens are plenary and Congress may
choose such agencies as it pleases to carry out whatever policy or rule of
exclusion it may adopt, and, so long as such agencies do not transcend limits of
authority or abuse discretion reposed in them, their judgement is not open to
challenge or review by courts.
H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1635, 1654.
8. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (upholding the broad power of Congress
to exclude members of the Communist Party); The Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae Chan Ping
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (exclusion of all Chinese laborers from the United States
deemed an appropriate exercise of the plenary power of Congress in immigration). In Galvan,
however, Justice Frankfurter suggested that some limitations on congressional power might be
appropriate. Galvan, 347 U.S. at 526-27. He wrote, however:
[T]he slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of Congress under review,
there is not merely "a page of history," but a whole volume. Policies pertaining
to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with
the political conduct of government .... [T]he formulation of these policies is
entrusted exclusively to Congress [and] has become about as firmly imbedded in
the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our
government.
Id. at 531 (citations omitted).
9. See infra notes 16-47 and accompanying text.
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ual rights, the judiciary has begun to take a more active role in inter-
preting and defining existing immigration laws.
This Comment examines the roles that Congress and the judici-
ary have assumed in the exclusion of noncitizens whose ideological
beliefs and associations are thought to pose a threat to United States
security. Section II surveys legislation enacted by Congress which
regulates the entry of aliens into the United States.'° Section III then
analyzes how the judiciary has begun to review this legislation and to
examine the particular rights affected by the ideological exclusion of
aliens.II Finally, Section IV concludes that the judiciary should pur-
sue more vigorously its role in reviewing immigration policy. 12 In
order to prevent arbitrary government action, judges should narrowly
define and clarify the applicable law and limit exclusion to those per-
sons who pose a demonstrable threat to United States security.
II. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 over the
veto of President Truman,' 3 who said that the "whole statute breathes
prejudice against the foreign born-alien and naturalized citizens
alike."' 4 Congress declared its right to "provide for the elimination of
undesirable aliens" and the power to "exclude any alien for any rea-
son whatsoever, such as the Government's dislike of the alien's polit-
ical or social ideas, or because he belongs to groups which are likely to
become public charges, or for other similar reasons.""
The most broadly written exclusion provision of the McCarran-
Walter Act is Section 1182(a)(27), 6 which allows exclusion of
"[a]liens who the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or
has reason to believe seek to enter the United States solely, princi-
pally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would be prejudi-
cial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security
10. See infra notes 13-43 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 44-200 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
13. The Senate voted fifty-seven to twenty-six to override the veto, only two votes more
than the two-thirds majority needed to override the President. See 98 CONG. REC. S8267-68
(daily ed. June 27, 1952).
14. Wasserman, The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952-Our New Alien and
Sedition Law, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 62, 62 n.5 (1953) (citing statements from a speech given by
President Harry S. Truman on October 8, 1952, in Buffalo, New York). Then Senator Richard
M. Nixon, who voted for the Act, later said that the "laws must be rewritten without bigotry."
Id.
15. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1653, 1654.
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1982).
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of the United States."' 7 Although it is an important function of the
executive branch to ensure national security through regulation of the
borders,"8 under Section 1182(a)(27), the consular officer and the
Attorney General are given the power to exclude noncitizens on the
basis of virtually any foreign policy concern, without restrictions as to
the "kinds of governmental concerns that would qualify." t 9 More-
over, a determination that a person is excludable under Section
1182(a)(27) is final and cannot be waived by immigration officials.2°
In Section 1182(a)(28), Congress established grounds for exclu-
sion based on status or affiliation rather than activities proscribed in
Section 1182(a)(27). 2' Section 1182(a)(28) excludes anarchists and
those who are affiliated with the Communist Party.22 Congress did
provide for exceptions, however, if the noncitizen could prove that
such affiliations were involuntary or had been renounced.23
17. Id.
18. In the legislative history of the McCarran-Walter Act, Congress noted:
[The right to control immigration] is an inherent and inalienable right of every
sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence, and its
welfare; that this power to exclude and to expel aliens, being a power affecting
international relations, is vested in the political departments of the Government,
and is to be regulated by treaty or act of Congress and to be executed by the
executive authority according to the regulations so established.
H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1653, 1654.
19. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding the use of
foreign policy to determine excludability under Section II 82(a)(27) because of its importance
to the public interest and national welfare), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1982). A waiver provision would be unnecessary in a more
carefully drawn statute. Hypothetically, deportations would not be necessary because
someone who is a proven security threat would never be allowed to enter the United States.
Yet the definition of security threat changes over time because policy and public interest are
not static and call for constant revision. Thus there is an inherent defect in the structure of a
piece of legislation that purports to define an absolute test, but bases that test on a theory that
requires flexibility and discretion.
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982) (Examples of excludable aliens include anarchists,
members of any organization opposed to all forms of organized government, and anyone
affiliated with the Communist Party.). Legislative classifications based on status, when a more
specific prohibited activity can be identified, often prove to be both overinclusive and
underinclusive. Under this legislation, there is a high probability that innocent aliens will be
unnecessarily detained and immigration resources wasted, and an equally high probability that
an alien who poses a potential security risk but does not fit the label will get through.
22. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982). A similar provision governs the deportation of
aliens. Id. § 1251(a)(6)(D)-(H) (1982).
23. Id. § 1182(a)(28)(I). Section 1182(a)(28) amends the Subversive Activities Control
Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. 781 (1950), to allow for the entry of aliens whose affiliation with the
Communist Party was involuntary, was solely when the alien was under sixteen years of age,
was necessary to obtain "employment, food rations, or other essentials of living", or was
renounced over five years prior to entry. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d. Sess. 49,
reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1703.
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Two inherent difficulties in the application of Section 1182(a)(28)
gradually became evident to Congress.24 First, the presumption of
inadmissability under Section (28) created the need for a case-by-case
evaluation of all nonimmigrant visas in order to determine the precise
nature of their affiliations. 25 This process allowed the Executive uni-
laterally to make "politically difficult individual decisions which
might imply an overall change in U.S. policy toward Communism. 26
Second, Congress recognized that Section 28, by closing the borders
to noncitizens who might advocate controversial or unorthodox polit-
ical views, violated United States commitments under the Helsinki
Accords 27 to promote "the free movement of people and ideas."2
8
In an effort to alleviate these difficulties, Congress passed the
McGovern Amendment in 1972.29 This amendment requires the Sec-
retary of State to recommend to the Attorney General that a nonim-
migrant visa be issued to "any alien who is excludable from the
United States by reason of membership in or affiliation with a pro-
scribed organization but who is otherwise admissible to the United
States,"'30 unless the Secretary certifies that "the admission of such
alien would be contrary to the security interests of the United
States." 3
Moreover, in 1987, Congress acknowledged that the executive
branch had used the McCarran-Walter Act, not simply to insure
national security, but to exclude certain noncitizens solely on the basis
of their political beliefs and affiliations.3 2 According to Congress,
24. See S. REP. No. 194, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1625, 1634-35.
25. S. REP.' No. 194, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 1635.
26. Id.
27. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 37 DEP'T ST. BULL. 323 (1975),
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 470.1 (R. Lillich ed. 1986). The
United States, as a signatory to the Accords, promised to "[m]ake it their aim to facilitate freer
movement and contacts, individually and collectively .... among persons, institutions and
organizations of the participating States, and to contribute to the solution of humanitarian
problems that arise in that connexion." Id. at 470.7. See generally Miranda, Rethinking the
Role of Politics in United States Immigration Law: The Helsinki Accords and Ideological
Exclusion of Aliens, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 301 (1988) (analysis of the Helsinki Accords and
the importance of United States compliance with agreements to open up borders).
28. S. REP. No. 194, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1625, 1635.
29. 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
30. Id. § 2691(a)
31. Id. The McGovern Amendment requires the Secretary of State to certify to the
chairmen of the foreign affairs committee that an applicant for a nonimmigrant visa presents a
potential threat to United States security before he can be excluded. Id. § 2691(d).
32. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 475, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 163, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2370, 2424 [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT].
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these exclusions resulted in United States citizens being denied
"access to the full spectrum of international opinion. ' 33 In order to
remedy this situation, Congress passed Section 901 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act,34 which prohibited the exclusion or
deportation of noncitizens "because of any past, current, or expected
beliefs, statements, or associations which, if engaged in by a United
States citizen in the United States, would be protected under the Con-
stitution of the United States."35 Congress expressed concern that, as
a consequence of politically motivated exclusion, "the reputation of
the United States as an open society, tolerant of divergent ideas, has
suffered."' 36 Notwithstanding this general prohibition of ideological
exclusions, Congress noted a legitimate interest in excluding those
aliens who pose an immediate, tangible threat to the safety of the
country and its citizens, when it provided for the exclusion, not only
of terrorists, but also of those who plan, recruit, finance, or otherwise
aid and abet terrorist activities. 3'
In October, 1988, however, Congress amended Section 901 and
limited its application to nonimmigrant aliens.3" Ironically, this
amendment grants first amendment rights to transient visitors, while
restoring the restrictions of the McCarran-Walter Act upon those
who wish to make the United States their permanent residence.
Furthermore, Section 1225(c)39 of the Act continues to provide
that the government may summarily exclude an alien "without any
inquiry" under Sections 1182(a)(27), (28) or (29), on the basis of
"information of a confidential nature. ' ' 4° The Attorney General,
under Section 1225(c), has the discretion to determine that a nonci-
tizen's entry would be "prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or
security" of the -United States and to exclude that person without a
hearing.4' This continued delegation of unrestricted executive discre-
tion demonstrates the degree to which the legislative branch has been
33. Id.
34. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-
204, § 901, 101 Stat. 1331 (1987). This legislation was passed with a sunset provision, which
limited its application to those admissions sought after December 31, 1987 and before March
1, 1989.
35. Id.
36. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 163.
37. Id. at 164. The terrorist exception also provides for the exclusion of persons who are
representatives of labor organizations that are instruments of a totalitarian government,
participants in Nazi persecutions, or affiliates of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Id. at
164, 165.
38. 134 CONG. REC. S13,800 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1988).
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1986) (original version enacted in 1952).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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unable to conform the law to meet the requirements of basic political
freedoms. Despite various attempts at legislative revision,42 Congress
has failed to modify any of the major provisions of the McCarran-
Walter Act itself.43 For thirty-seven years, a law that attempts to gov-
ern the volatile and changing field of immigration and foreign rela-
tions has remained substantially unchanged, while the political and
social climate among nations has developed in a manner that makes
that legislation impracticable.
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSE
The judiciary must consider three important constitutional prin-
ciples when deciding an ideological exclusion case: (1) the sovereign
power of Congress to control the borders," (2) the alien's right to due
process,45 and (3) the United States citizen's first amendment right to
receive information and ideas.46 When the political process fails to
produce an appropriate balance of these principles, the judiciary must
ensure that each is properly considered.
In United States v. Robel, 47 the Supreme Court stated that
"[w]hen Congress' exercise of one of its enumerated powers clashes
with those individual liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, it is our
'delicate and difficult task' to determine whether the resulting restric-
tion on freedom can be tolerated.1 48 Implicit in this statement is the
42. See infra notes 24-38 and accompanying text.
43. Representative Barney Frank introduced legislation to amend the McCarran-Walter
Act in 1987. Section 1182(a)(3) of the proposed bill reads:
SECURITY GROUNDS. - Any alien who a consular officer or the Attorney
General knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, is likely to engage after
entry in-
(A) any activity which is prohibited by the laws of the United States relating to
espionage or sabotage,
(B) any other criminal activity which endangers public safety or national
security,
(C) any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control or
overthrow of, the Government of the United States by force, violence, or other
unconstitutional means, or
(D) any terrorist activity ... is excludable.
H.R. 1119, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1987).
44. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954).
45. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (noting that "a continuously present
resident alien is- entitled to a fair hearing when threatened with deportation"); Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 600 (1953) (stating that there is no distinction between aliens
and residents for due process purposes).
46. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (the first case to interpret the
first amendment as protecting the right to receive information, as well as the right to distribute
it).
47. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
48. Id. at 264.
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notion that, because the judiciary is the final arbiter of constitutional
rights, an affirmative duty is imposed on the courts to ensure that
these rights survive the failure of the political process. The judiciary
has begun to hear ideological exclusion cases more frequently and to
define more precisely the scope of executive power under the McCar-
ran-Walter Act.49 In order to fully protect the constitutional interests
at stake, however, the judiciary must balance these interests with
national security interests and interpret the substantive immigration
law in a manner consistent with constitutional principles.
A. Justiciability Issues
In order for the judiciary to retain its proper constitutional role
as a check on the political branches of government, the threshold
question of justiciability is critical." It is important that the judici-
ary, in the protection of individual rights, follow the principle set
forth by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo:5 "Congress has ple-
nary authority in all areas in which it has substantive legislative juris-
diction ... so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend
some other constitutional restriction."52 Because of the virtually
unchecked power of the political branches under the McCarran-Wal-
ter Act, the question of justiciability is particularly important. When
a challenge to the constitutionality of the McCarran-Walter Act or its
application arises, the judiciary is in a position less susceptible to the
changing political climate and can better afford the plaintiffs an adju-
dication free from popular pressures.53
The Supreme Court has traditionally viewed the process by
which noncitizens enter this country and are naturalized as a plenary
49. See infra notes 50-124 and accompanying text.
50. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). In Cooper, the Supreme Court reiterated its
constitutional role as the supreme interpreter of the Constitution, despite the political fallout
that such an interpretation could entail: "[Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)]
declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the
Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system." Id. at 18.
51. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
52. Id. at 6.
53. Judicial objectivism does not always occur. For example, the Supreme Court, in Debs
v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), upheld the conviction of socialist Eugene V. Debs under
the Espionage Act of 1917, just one week after the Court's enunciation of the "clear and
present danger" test in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Debs, 249 U.S. at
216. Debs is widely recognized as a low point in the Court's protection of civil liberties and its
ability to insulate itself from the fervent anti-socialist bias of the times. See Rabban, The
Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. Ci. L. REV. 1205, 1352 (1983)
(describing the inability of the Supreme Court to insulate itself from the political climate of the
fifties and its failure to adequately protect free speech in times of crisis).
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power of Congress "inherent in sovereignty."54 Implicit in this view
is the concept that executive and legislative policies regarding immi-
gration are inevitably political and therefore warrant only limited
judicial review. 5 The application of this notion of judicial deference,
however, appears to be discretionary because the courts have rou-
tinely reviewed cases involving politics or immigration.56 Judicial
invocation of foreign relations as a talisman to ward off review vio-
lates the notion of separation of powers which underlies the political
question doctrine. 7 In Baker v. Carr," the Court noted that "it is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." 9 In the following Section,
this Comment analyzes the judicial treatment of standing, mootness,
and ripeness issues in several ideological exclusion cases.
1. STANDING
The question of justiciability directly impacts the ability of an
alien not yet in the United States to challenge governmental action
under the McCarran-Walter Act.60 The doctrine of standing requires
an individual to have a legally recognizable interest in the outcome of
54. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). See also Boutilier v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (prohibition on the naturalization of
homosexuals held to be a valid act of Congress); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,
214 U.S. 320 (1909) (holding that it is within congressional power to penalize a ship owner for
the transport of an alien with a contagious disease).
55. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)
("Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign
attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial
control."); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1894) (deferring to the power
of Congress to exclude aliens and to define the terms for entry in upholding the application of
the Chinese Exclusion Act to a Chinese merchant on a brief business trip).
56. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (holding that
"no Act of Congress [in the immigration context] can authorize a violation of the
Constitution"); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (upholding the deportation of
former member of the Communist Party); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952)
(stating that the power to exclude aliens "is, of course, subject to judicial intervention under
the 'paramount law of the Constitution' ") (citation omitted).
57. Justice Marshall declared that "[iut is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803). Thus when one branch abdicates its constitutional role, the balance of power is struck
in favor of the other two branches.
58. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
59. Id. at 211. The Court in Baker determined that when the justiciability of a political
question is at issue, the Court should look at the historical treatment of the issue by the
political branches and the practicality of judicial review. See id. at 211-12.
60. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972). The Court allowed Mandel to be
a party because "he [was] symbolic of the problem." Id. (citing transcript of oral argument);
see also Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1114 (1st Cir. 1988) (acknowledged Allende's status
as a symbolic party).
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the litigation. 6' Therefore, because excludable aliens are not citizens,
they have no constitutional right to object to their exclusion.62
In Kleindienst v. Mandel,63 the Supreme Court agreed for the
first time, to hear a case involving the parameters of exclusion under
Section 1182(a)(28) of the McCarran-Walter Act. In Kleindienst,
Mandel, a Belgian Marxist economist, had twice applied for and been
granted a nonimmigrant visa in order to attend speaking engagements
in the United States." On both occasions, the federal government
imposed specific restrictions on permissible activities as a condition togranting his visa. 65 In 1969, he was invited to a conference at Stan-
ford University and was denied a nonimmig'ant visa.66 Mandel and
the United States citizens who invited him to speak filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.67
The United States citizens claimed that the government violated their
first amendment right to receive information and ideas.68
Over government objections, the district court determined that
the United States citizens who invited Mandel to speak had standing
to bring their claim.69  The government then sought review in the
Supreme Court,7" and the Court affirmed the grant of standing by
proceeding to the merits of the case.7 It is ironic that Kleindienst, a
decision which grants standing with no explanation, has become the
61. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (holding that the plaintiff "must
assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or
interests of third parties").
62. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) ("This Court has long held that an
alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no
constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a
sovereign prerogative."). The Supreme Court, in United States v. Macintosh, (283 U.S. 605,
615 (1931)), held that "[n]aturalization is a privilege, to be given, qualified or withheld as
Congress may determine." The idea that an excludable alien has no constitutional rights
reflects the positivist notion that, because government exists before the individual, he is entitled
only to those rights that the government defines for him.
63. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
64. See id. at 756.
65. See id. at 758.
66. See id. at 756-57.
67. See Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
68. See id. at 622; see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (holding that the first amendment requires an uninhibited
market place of ideas and that it is the public's right to receive social, political, and moral
ideas); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (protecting the right of the citizen to
receive information concerning governmental affairs and important public issues).
69. See Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. at 632.
70. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
71. Id. at 761.
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foundation for claims of standing in ideological exclusion cases.72
The Court's willingness to proceed with the case has opened the way
for lower courts to hear exclusion cases on the merits.73
The issue of standing is somewhat different in the context of
deportation. It is established law that aliens already in the United
States are protected by the first amendment. 4 Therefore, deportable
aliens can attempt to show a chilling effect on their own recognized
first amendment rights.
2. MOOTNESS
The Supreme Court has determined that a case is moot "when
the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome."' 7- A case becomes moot when
"(1) 'there is no reasonable expectation...' that the alleged violation
will recur, . . . and (2) interim relief or events have completely and
irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation."76
There are, however, equitable exceptions which allow an other-
wise moot case to be heard. In Allende v. Shultz,77 the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit refused to declare moot a chal-
lenge to the McCarran-Walter Act because the exclusion was "capa-
ble of repetition yet evading review. "78 In Allende, a group of
American scholars, politicians, and religious leaders had invited Hor-
tensia Allende,79 the wife of former Chilean president Salvador
Allende, to speak in the United States.8" The State Department ini-
tially denied her application for a nonimmigrant visa under Section
1182(a)(28) because of her membership in the World Peace Council
and the Women's International Democratic Federation, organizations
that the State Department considered to be fronts for the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union.8' Instead of pursuing exclusion under Sec-
tion 1182(a)(28), the State Department set aside the question of
72. See Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1114 n.4 (1st Cir. 1988) (relying on Kleindienst
in holding that a potential deprivation of a United States citizen's first amendment right to
receive information is a cognizable interest).
73. See, e.g., Allende v. Shultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220, 1223 (D. Mass. 1985), aff'd, 845 F.2d
1111 (Ist Cir. 1988).
74. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953); Bridges v. Wixon 326
U.S. 135, 148 (1945); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1222 (9th Cir. 1988).
75. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969).
76. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (citations omitted).
77. 845 F.2d 1111 (Ist Cir. 1988).
78. Id. at 1115.
79. Allende was a symbolic party only. See id. at 1114.
80. See id. at 1112-13. Allende was invited to speak on the political and social situation in
Latin America, particularly as it concerned women. See id. at 1113.
81. See id. at 1113.
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waiver required under that section and issued an advisory opinion
barring her entrance as "prejudicial to the foreign policy interests of
the United States" under Section 1182(a)(27).12
Allende challenged the government's power to exclude her under
Section 1182(a)(27). s3 She claimed that her exclusion infringed on the
first amendment rights of the citizens who invited her to speak to
receive information, as recognized in Kleindienst. 4 While the case
was pending, the government issued a nonimmigrant visa, but refused
to disavow the policy of applying Section 1182(a)(27) to others simi-
larly situated. 5 The First Circuit concluded that the case must be
heard because the government could continue to carry out the policy
in question and avoid judicial review by granting an individual visa
when its actions were challenged. 6
The courts' renewed willingness to hear ideological exclusion
cases was also apparent in Abourezk v. Reagan. 7 In Abourezk,
Thomas Borge, Interior Minister of Nicaragua, Olga Finlay and Leo-
nore Rodriguez Lezcano, members of The Federation of Cuban
Women, and Nino Pasti, former Italian General and an active partici-
pant in the World Peace Council, were denied non-immigrant visas
under Section 1182(a)(27).8 s The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia determined that mootness would not bar an
adjudication on the merits.8 9 The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia rejected the government's contention that no
possibility of repetition existed because every visa application is con-
sidered on an individual basis.90 The court concluded that the poten-
tial for similar denials in the future was real and not merely a
'theoretical possibility.' ",9
82. Id. at 1113-14 (citing the affidavit of Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger,
which declared Allende ineligible for a nonimmigrant visa because of her membership in the
World Peace Council, and Eagleburger's official determination that her entrance would be
contrary to foreign policy interests).
83. Id. at 1112.
84. See id. at 1114.
85. See id. at 1115 & n.7.
86. See id. at 1115 n.7. The court further rejected the contention that the passage of
Section 901 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 901, 101 Stat.
1331, 1339 (1987), made the action moot. Allende, 845 F.2d at 1115 n.7. The court reasoned
that, although Section 901 limits the power of the government to exclude an alien for speech
and association, it does not address the parameters of the government's power to exclude
under Section 1182(a)(28) of the McCarran-Walter Act. Id.
87. 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
88. See id. at 1048-49. Three cases were originally filed, which were subsequently
consolidated into one action. Id. at 1048.
89. See id. at 1052.
90. See id.
91. Id. (citing Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982)).
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In both Allende and Abourezk, the courts looked behind the
mootness theory proffered by the government and made a decision
based on the realistic impact that a dismissal would have on the sub-
stantive issues in question. This type of searching inquiry is the stan-
dard of review required to strike the proper balance between the
executive interest in unfettered control of the borders and the protec-
tion of individual constitutional rights under the McCarran-Walter
Act.
-. The judiciary, however, has recently applied mootness principles
to avoid substantive review of administrative hearings. In Randall v.
Meese,92 Margaret Randall, a well-known poet, professor, and author,
challenged the denial of her status adjustment application by the dis-
trict director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).93
Randall was joined by writers and professors who claimed that the
district director had violated their constitutional right to receive infor-
mation when he denied Randall's application for adjustment of status
as a matter of discretion, based solely on the political content of her
writings.94 Soon after this denial, the district director initiated depor-
tation proceedings and asked Randall to show cause why she should
not be deported.95 After reading Randall's work, 96 the immigration
judge presiding at the deportation hearing decided that, although her
"non-proscribed written political opinions' 97 should be given neutral
evidentiary weight in a discretionary determination, she was statuto-
rily ineligible for an adjustment of status because "her various writ-
ings advocate the economic, international, and governmental
doctrines of world communism. ' 9s
Randall subsequently petitioned the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia for a preliminary injunction to halt her
92. 1987 Westlaw 12570 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 854 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
93. Id. at 2.
94. Id. at 1. When an alien in the United States applies for permanent residency, the
immigration officer's power to adjust the alien's status is viewed by the court as "a matter of
administrative grace not a mere statutory eligibility." Id. at 12.
95. Id. at 2.
96. See Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The fact that the judge
must read the work in order to make a decision shows that his determination of excludability
cannot be content-neutral.
97. Id. at 477 (quoting the immigration judge).
98. Id. Based on an extensive review of Randall's work, the immigration judge concluded
that "portions of her various writing advocate the economic, international and governmental
doctrines of world communism," and therefore, she was ineligible for adjustment of status
under the statute. Id. This kind of interpretation of a writer's work ignores its metaphorical
or symbolic aspects and arbitrarily assigns literal meanings to words or passages that may be
purely figurative. See Cole, Deportation of a Poet, THE NATION, June 25, 1988, at 892, 893.
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deportation.99 The district court refused to grant Randall's motion
for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the case."0 The court held
that there was no longer a need to remand the case to the district
director because Randall had "received the review she seeks."''
Apparently the court relied on a mootness theory in holding that,
because Randall sought review of the district director's use of discre-
tion and the immigration judge had already reyiewed this use of dis-
cretion, she had been given all the "fair consideration she
warrants."° 2
In this holding, the district court found that Randall had
received sufficient redress in the immigration judge's decision that the
district director's use of discretion was inappropriate. 103 This holding
is in conflict with the fact that the immigration judge did not have
jurisdiction to review a decision made by the district director; the
Code of Federal Regulations states that "[n]o [administrative] appeal
lies from the denial of an application by the district director."''
When the applicable statutory framework suggests that the judi-
ciary has jurisdiction, a court's refusal to hear an allegation of consti-
tutional violation contradicts both congressional intent and the
judicial duty to decide "what the law is." 1 5 Absent judicial interven-
tion at the instruction of Congress, the executive branch assumes vir-
tually plenary power in derogation of the intent of Congress and the
role of the court.
3. RIPENESS
Article III of the Constitution and separation of power principles
require that a dispute be sufficiently concrete and well-developed
before the judiciary can properly hear the case. 10 6 On appeal, the
99. See Randall, 1987 Westlaw 12570, at 2.
100. See id. at 15.
101. Id. at 11. The court's refusal to allow a remand completely ignores the fact that the
relief Randall sought was adjustment of status, relief that the immigration judge in the
deportation proceeding did not in fact afford her. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440
U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (noting that a case should be held moot only if the "interim relief or
events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation").
102. Randall, 1987 Westlaw 12570, at 13.
103. Id. Despite this holding, the court recognized that Randall sustained cognizable injury
to her first amendment rights and a chilling effect on her efforts to teach and to speak freely.
Id. at 5-6.
104. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5)(ii) (1988); see also Fleurinor v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 585 F.2d 129, 135 (5th Cir. 1978) (declaring an immigration judge was without
jurisdiction to review an INS district director's decision).
105. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
106. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975).
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D.C. Circuit avoided the substantive issues raised in the Randall 107
case by applying principles of ripeness and administrative exhaus-
tion. ' The court required that Randall take the "normal appeal
route,"'0 9 on the grounds that a remand to the district director would
be "confusion-breeding" and "conflict-generating."" '  The court
viewed Randall's attempt at remand as an "attempt to turn a prelimi-
nary ... administrative procedure intended as a convenience for the
alien into a fulcrum to leverage judicial review."'
The effect of the D.C. Circuit's decision in Randall is to place the
district director's judgment beyond appeal. As the dissent noted,
" '[a] person threatened with deportation cannot be denied the right
to challenge the constitutional validity of the process which led to his
status merely on the basis of speculation over the availability of other
forms of relief.' "" I2 Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the decisions of
both the district court and the D.C. Circuit, Randall remains in limbo
because the judiciary initially told her that she was too late, and later
told her that she was too early, to receive a review of her constitu-
tional claims.
At approximately the same time, in Rafeedie v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service,' "3 the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia held that principles of ripeness and exhaustion did
not bar a suit that challenged the summary exclusion proceedings on
constitutional and statutory grounds.' Rafeedie was a resident alien
who had lived in the United States for thirteen years, had extensive
family in this country, and was politically active in Arab-American
107. See Randall.v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
108. See id. at 474.
109. Id. at 482. The normal appeal route involves a return to the deportation proceeding
and an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals before a proceeding in the appropriate
circuit court. Id. at 481.
110. Id. at 481. One of the important factors to be considered in deciding a ripeness issue is
the harm the plaintiff will suffer from a delay. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983). Since 1984, Randall's
first amendment right to speak, write, and teach had been severely curtailed. Brief for
Appellant at 11, Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5230). She was also
the victim of stigmatization because of her Communist label. Id. Finally, she was unable to
travel abroad where her three children reside. Id. at 12. The harm Margaret Randall
continued to suffer would seem to far outweigh the confusion with which the court seemed so
concerned.
S11. Randall, 854 F.2d at 482. But see.Jaa v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d
569, 571 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the district court has jurisdiction over a district
director's denial of adjustment of status).
112. Randall, 854 F.2d at 487 (Mikva, J., dissenting) (quoting Immigration & Nat-
uralization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 937 (1983)).
113. 688 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1988).
114. See id. at 739.
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causes."'5 Upon his return from a two-week trip out of the country,
he was "paroled for deferred inspection" by the INS, which allowed
him to enter the country but remain subject to exclusion proceed-
ings. 16 Ten months later, the INS classified him as excludable under
Sections 1182(a)(27) and (28) and began ordinary exclusion proceed-
ings. 17 Rafeedie requested a bill of particulars regarding the charges
against him."' One day before the expiration of the time given the
INS to comply with this request, the INS issued a summary exclusion
order under Section 1225(c), which allows for governmental exclusion
without explanation."19
Rafeedie challenged his exclusion by raising a "wholesale attack"
on the constitutional adequacy of Section 1225(c).' 2°  The district
court determined that it was the appropriate forum for review of
Rafeedie's deportation order and the constitutionality of Section
1225(c). 12' The district court examined the purposes underlying the
doctrine of administrative exhaustion and concluded that the admin-
istrative factual record would be of little use, 122 that interruption of
the administrative process was insignificant, 123 and that the INS did
115. Id. at 731-32. Rafeedie had written newspaper articles, appeared on local radio talk
shows, and participated in the activities of several Arab and Palestinian social and political
organizations. See id.
116. See id. at 733. The INS will allow an incoming alien to enter the United States
temporarily and defer inspection, if it is determined that he is not likely to "abscond or pose a
security risk." 8 C.F.R. § 1225.3(c) (1988).
117. See Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 733 & n.9. Because Rafeedie was given deferred
inspection, he remained subject to exclusion rather than deportation hearings. Id. at 733.
Despite the fact that the government considered Rafeedie to be a security risk, the INS allowed
him to remain in the United States, undisturbed, for ten months. Id. The disparate treatment
of permanent resident aliens who attempt to reenter the country illustrates the difficulty with
the legal fiction that allows aliens to enter the country but remain excludable. See, e.g., Jean v.
Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 970 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (holding that Haitian aliens detained in South
Florida have not "entered" the United States for immigration purposes and therefore cannot
claim equal protection under the fifth amendment). See generally Note, Jean v. Nelson:
Expansion of the "Entry Doctrine" Fiction, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 576 (1985) (describing the
judiciary's role in creating the entry doctrine fiction, which requires m6re than physical
presence in the United States in order to receive constitutional protection).
118. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 734. Rafeedie filed a motion for a bill of particulars in order
to obtain more detailed information concerning the grounds for his exclusion because the
government only cited the statutory language of Sections 1182(a)(27) and (28)(F) without
explanation. See id. at 733-34 & n.10.
119. See id. at 734. The INS acted under the summary exclusion provisions of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1986).
120. See Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 737.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 738 & n.23. The court concluded that the administrative factual record
would not be useful because summary exclusion proceedings do not require the INS to provide
any reason for the exclusion, no hearing or evidentiary record is kept, and confidential
information is not disclosed in the record. See id.
123. See id. The court reasoned that, because it took the INS more than one year to bring
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not have the expertise required to adjudicate the important constitu-
tional issues involved.' 24
Most of these principles could have been applied to the Randall
case as well. Both cases involved constitutional claims which the dis-
trict court was statutorily and practically capable of adjudicating.
Given the emerging trend of extending review to cases involving con-
stitutional attacks against the McCarran-Walter Act, Randall is an
anomaly.
B. Substantive Issues
One of the most important substantive issues affecting the alien
seeking entry into the United States is whether he is excludable or
deportable. The entry doctrine is a legal fiction which is used to cate-
gorize an alien as either deportable or excludable and is often determi-
native of the alien's constitutional rights. 25
The difficulty with the entry doctrine is its lack of definition and
its misapplication. The Supreme Court, in Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei,126 defined excludable aliens as those who have
not, legally or illegally, crossed the "threshold of initial entry."127
Although Mezei makes it clear that physical presence is insufficient to
constitute entry, it does not provide much insight into what is
required for entry. In Rosenberg v. Fleuti,28 the Court held that a
"brief, casual and innocent" trip is not sufficient to trigger an entry
proceeding. 29 Despite their attempt to clarify the requirements for
entry, the guidelines remain unclear.
summary exclusion proceedings against Rafeedie and that these proceedings interrupted the
ordinary exclusion process, the INS was only minimally disturbed by this intrusion. See id.
124. See id. The court further held the statutory provision requiring administrative
exhaustion, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1982), did not apply because Rafeedie raised a constitutional
challenge. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 738-39.
125. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958). The Supreme Court noted in
Barber:
[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens who
have come to our shores seeking admission ... and those who are within the
United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance the
Court has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the
former category who are merely "on the threshold of initial entry."
Id. at 187 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)).
126. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
127. Id. at 212. When aliens who illegally gain 'access to this country are considered
deportable, the law rewards illegal activity with constitutional rights and punishes those who
attempt to enter the country legally. See Note, Jean v. Nelson: Expansion of the "Entry
Doctrine" Fiction, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 576, 584 (1985) (describing the legal constructs which
deny constitutional protection to those aliens who attempt to enter the United States legally).
128. 374 U.S. 449 (1962).
129. Id. at 461.
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The importance of the distinction can be seen in American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Meese,' 30 which declared the ideo-
logical deportation provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act', uncon-
stitutional.' 32 In order to reach this conclusion, the United States
District Court for the Central District of California recognized that a
resident alien has full first amendment rights in the deportation pro-
cess. 13 3 Although the court acknowledged that Congress and the
Executive have plenary power in the exclusion of aliens, the court
rejected the government's argument that this power extends to depor-
tation of aliens within the United States who have been recognized as
having constitutional rights. 134 The court noted that Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy 13 was the only Supreme Court case involving the first
amendment rights of an alien in a deportation hearing. 136 In order to
determine these rights, the Court in Harisiades applied the first
amendment test from Dennis v. United States,'37 the same test used to
determine the first amendment rights of United States citizens. 138 The
American-Arab court, therefore, held that the use of this standard
indicates that the rights of an alien in the deportation context are the
same as a United States citizen.' 39
Furthermore, the district court relied on the principle that the
first amendment not only protects our right to speak, but also protects
the arena of divergent ideas by allowing all persons to speak regard-
less of the source."4 Therefore, the right of an alien to speak should
be as fully protected as a corporation 14 1 or a United States citizen.
Although the issue in American-Arab is the first amendment rights of
aliens in the deportation context, the first amendment principles
would seem applicable to all aliens, both excludable and deportable.
If speech has an inherent value in the market place which goes beyond
130. 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
131. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6)(D), (F), (G), (H) (1982) (providing for the deportation of
subversive aliens including those who advocate Communism, those affiliated with Communist
organizations, and those who teach or write about Communist theory).
132. See American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1084.
133. See id. at 1082.
134. See id. at 1077.
135. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
136. American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1075.
137. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
138. American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1077.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1078. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), the
Supreme Court held that -[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union, or individual." Id. at 777.
141. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
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the individual speaker's status, all persons should be given the right to
speak. '42
The following analysis of substantive issues exemplifies the treat-
ment of excludable aliens who retain virtually no constitutional rights
and have been systematically abused by the exclusion provisions of
the McCarran-Walter Act.
1. APPLICANTS PREJUDICIAL TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Of the recent developments in the area of law concerning the
exclusion of aliens under the McCarran-Walter Act, one of the most
significant is the judiciary's attempt to narrow the broad contours of
Section 1182(a)(27) and to define its proper relationship to Section
1182(a)(28). In Allende v. Shultz,'4 3 the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit determined that the proscribed activity
that would be "prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the wel-
fare, safety, or security of the United States," under Section
11 82(a)(27), must be something other than mere entry or presence in
this country." The Allende court examined the plain language of
Section 1182(a)(27) and concluded that Congress intentionally distin-
guished between classifications that require a prohibited activity as a
basis for exclusion and classifications that allow for exclusion based
on the alien's status. 45 The court concluded that, if the government
was permitted to exclude aliens under Section 11 82(a)(27) on the basis
of their status, the distinction between Sections (27) and (28) would
be rendered meaningless, and the possibility of a waiver of exclusion
under Section (28), which does not exist under Section (27), would be
anomalous.' 46 Furthermore, the court refused to allow the govern-
ment to circumvent the McGovern Amendment provision for waiver
of Section 1182(a)(28), by misclassifying Allende as a noncitizen,
excludable under Section 1182(a)(27).' 47
142. The district court in American-Arab declared the deportation provisions of the
McCarran-Walter Act overbroad in violation of the first amendment. American-Arab, 714 F.
Supp. at 1084. Because of the similarity between the exclusion and the deportation provisions,
many of the same arguments apply.
143. 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988).
144. Id. at 1116.
145. See id. at 1117. For a provision permitting exclusion based on status, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(28) (1982). Section 1182(a)(27) allows the government to exclude those aliens who
"seek to enter the United States solely ... to engage in activities" that would threaten the
national safety. Id. § 1182(a)(27). The court pointed out that the government's contention
that an alien's entrance in itself qualifies as an activity is absurd because it is impossible for an
alien to enter to engage in the act of entry. Allende, 845 F.2d at 1117.
146. See Allende, 845 F.2d at 1118.
147. See id. at 1113, 1118; see also Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1057 (D.C. Cir.
1986), on remand, Nos. 83-3739, 83-374, 83-3895 (D.D.C. June 7 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed
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The narrow,. precise, and literal interpretation of the language of
the McCarran-Walter Act by the First Circuit is essential to ensuring
that both governmental and individual interests are protected.
Requiring the government to provide objective proof that someone
presents a tangible threat to national security gives meaning and effect
to the Act, while ensuring that a balance is struck between national
security interests and interests in open communication and the free
flow of ideas. The Allende court based its decision on the rational
interaction between the rules, and not on a judicial interest in prohib-
iting unsubstantiated exclusion by the Executive. This rational rela-
tion between the rules is a more stable, enduring basis for judicial
review than the view of one circuit court judge that executive discre-
tion should be limited.
2. APPLICANTS WHO ARE COMMUNIST OR SUBVERSIVE
Kleindienst v. Mandel "I provides a standard of review for cases
involving exclusion under Section 1182(a)(28).' 49 In Kleindienst, the
Supreme Court deferred to the authority of the political branches in
immigration matters and held that exclusion under Sectioh
11 82(a)(28) was justified by a "facially legitimate and bona fide" rea-
son.15 The Court held that, if the Executive is able to establish such
a reason, it is not the role of the judiciary to inquire further.' 5 ' This
standard of minimal scrutiny appears inadequate to ensure that the
government's reasons for exclusion are genuine and substantial rather
than pretextual.' 52
library, Dist. file). In accord with Allende, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in Abourezk defined activity in Section 1 182(a)(27) to be a conduct-based classification. Id. at
1054. The court allowed the government the opportunity to demonstrate congressional
acquiescence to such classifications by demonstrating an administrative practice of excluding
aliens under Section 1 182(a)(27), because their entry or presence was deemed prejudicial to the
public interest. See id. at 1054-56. The government, however, could show only what the court
of appeals described as "meager evidence" of administrative practice. Id. at 1056. The district
court, on remand, found the evidence to be only "imperceptibly more weighty" than that
initially presented before the court of appeals. See Abourezk, 1988 Lexis 5203, at 14-15.
148. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
149. See id. at 754.
150. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 769-70. The "facially legitimate and bona fide reason"
standard is unique in constitutional doctrine. In applying it, the courts do not look behind the
reason or balance its justification against the first amendment interests of those who wish to
hear the alien speak. In no other context is legislation that impinges on a protected right given
only rational scrutiny. It is open to question whether the government could demonstrate a
compelling federal interest in denying entrance to an alien solely on the basis of ideological
beliefs. See id. at 779 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 770.
152. In fact, the government in Kleindienst conceded that Mandel was apparently unaware
of the previous visa restrictions. Id. at 778 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It was not clear,
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Under the language of the McCarran-Walter Act, it is difficult to
determine what might be a facially legitimate reason for exclusion
under Section 1182(a)(28). Terms such as anarchist and subversive
are labels that require a subjective determination of their meaning
before they can be applied. Therefore, any subjective determination
of inadmissability that can be justified by a facially legitimate reason
turns the test from an objective to a subjective one.
The waiver for temporary admission under the McGovern
Amendment has limited the application of Section 1182(a)(28) and
has provided some safeguards against mass exclusion by the Execu-
tive.' 5 3 There is an inherent flaw, however, with a classification sys-
tem that penalizes someone for political beliefs without regard to any
demonstrable benefit or governmental security interest. As Justice
Douglas pointed out in his dissent in Kleindienst: "Thought control is
not within the competence of any branch of government."" 4
Furthermore, one of the fundamental purposes of the first
amendment is to encourage the interchange of ideas, especially those
ideas that comment on the government."5 ' Because the Court recog-
nized that United States citizens have a first amendment right to
receive information and exchange ideas, this right must be protected
by a safeguard more rigorous than a mere rationality test. The legiti-
mate and bona fide reason standard is inapposite to any other first
amendment standard.
Brandenburg v. Ohio requires that in order to override a first
amendment interest, the government must demonstrate that the
speech is an incitement to immediate lawless action, not simply that it
advocates a doctrine that promotes violent change.."' This require-
therefore, whether or not he actually committed the alleged abuse of his previous visa
restrictions, which led to his exclusion. Id.
153. See Neuborne & Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: America's National Border and the Free
Flow of Ideas, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 719, 751 (1985) (pointing out that the certification
requirement of the McGovern Amendment reduces the number of exclusions under Section
(28) because it is politically undesirable for the State Department to certify to Congress that an
alien was a security threat solely on the basis of his membership in a Communist organization).
154. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 772 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
155. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (denouncing the early
alien and sedition acts, which prohibited criticism of the government as violative of first
amendment right to free speech).
156. 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per curiam) (reversing the conviction of a member of the
Ku Klux Klan under Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism statute, and declaring the legislation
unconstitutional because it provides for punishment of speech that advocates the use of force
without a showing that it will produce imminent lawless action).
157. See id. at 447-48; Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961) ("[T]he mere
abstract teaching of Communist theory, including the teaching of the moral propriety or even
moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for
violent action.").
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ment reflects the'democratic principle that the proper focus of restric-
tion is not on thought or speech, but on specific actions that pose a
threat to the public safety and welfare.' 58 In order to prevent the
political use of Section 11 82(a)(28) to limit free political discourse, the
courts must apply a form of the clear and present danger test that was
set out by the Court in Brandenburg to protect political messages of
all kinds.' 59
3. APPLICANTS SUBJECT TO SUMMARY EXCLUSION
An ordinary exclusion proceeding involves notice, 16° an open
hearing with an immigration judge, the right to introduce evidence,
and the right to an appeal. 6 ' In contrast, the summary exclusion
provision of Section 1225(c) of the McCarran-Walter Act,162 provides
that any alien who appears to be excludable under Sections
1182(a)(27) or 1182(a)(28) on the basis of confidential information
will be temporarily excluded.' 63 The alien is to be provided with the
opportunity to prepare and submit a "written statement and accom-
panying information" in his defense. 164 If the Attorney General
determines that the alien would endanger the public interest, safety,
or security of the United States, exclusion results without additional
inquiry. 165
Rafeedie v. Immigration & Naturalization Service 166 was the first
case in which the INS used Section 1225(c) to exclude a permanent
resident alien who was returning to the United States after traveling
abroad.167  Rafeedie challenged his exclusion on both statutory and
constitutional grounds.' 68 The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia rejected Rafeedie's statutory reading of "aliens"
158. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-49.
159. See id. at 447-48. The Brandenburg decision was a response to Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), and the failure of the courts to adequately protect individuals from
statutory restrictions on politically unpopular political speech. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
160. The Supreme Court defined adequate notice in the exclusion context as giving the alien
enough time so that he has "a realistic opportunity to prepare [his] case for effective
presentation in ... [a] hearing." Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982). In Rafeedie, the
noncitizen was told only that the government had confidential information which would
require his exclusion. 688 F. Supp. 729, 734 (D.D.C. 1988). However adequate this notice
was, it provided no basis for the preparation of Rafeedie's legal defense, making his
opportunity to respond meaningless.
161. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1982).
162. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1982).
163. See id.
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. 688 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1988). See supra notes 114-125 and accompanying text.
167. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 731.
168. See id. at 742-43. Rafeedie challenged the authority of the INS to exclude summarily a
IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION
in Section 1225(c), as not applying to permanent resident aliens, and
held that, "[a]bsent a clearly expressed intention to the contrary, that
language must be given its ordinary meaning," which includes all
aliens. 6 9 The court further held that the fact that the INS had never
applied this section to resident aliens before was not in itself compel-
ling.'7 ° Rafeedie claimed that the statute, as applied, was unconstitu-
tional because of his status as a permanent resident alien.17
Although the court agreed that it would be a violation of due process
to apply Section 1225(c) to a lawful resident alien who "remains phys-
ically present" in this country, 7 2 the court held that a reentering alien
would only be given due process rights "depending on the circum-
stances of that alien's trip abroad." 7 ' The district court arrived at
this narrow interpretation, despite broad language in the Supreme
Court's decision in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, '74 which held:
[O]nce an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he
becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to
all people within our borders. Such rights include those protected
by the First and the Fifth Amendments and the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. None of these provisions acknowl-
edges any distinctions between citizens and resident aliens.' 75
The district court noted that Colding determined that an alien is enti-
tled to due process upon reentering the country only if his status can
be "'assimilate[d] . . . to that of an alien continuously resident and
physically present in the United States.' "176
permanent resident alien under Section 1225(c) and, in the alternative, challenged the
application as violative of his procedural due process rights. See id.
169. Id. at 743.
170. See id. The fact that the INS never summarily excluded a resident alien should be
given greater weight when a deprivation of due process rights is involved.
171. Id. at 744. The summary exclusion of nonresident aliens was upheld in United States
ex rel. Kasel de Pagliera v. Savoretti, 139 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Fla. 1956). Because Rafeedie's
exclusion proceeding was the first time the INS attempted to exclude a permanent resident
alien, there was no precedent for such a holding.
172. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 744.
173. Id.
174. 344 U.S. 590 (1953). Chew, a permanent resident alien, joined the Coast Guard in
1950 as a seaman on a merchant vessel, which sailed out of New York City and stopped at
several ports in the Far East. Id. at 594. After a four month voyage, Chew was ordered
temporarily excluded, based on 8 C.F.R. § 175.57(b) (1988), the predecessor to Section
1225(c). Id. at 595. Chew was not permitted to land, nor was he told the reasons for his
exclusion. Id. The Court determined that this action violated Chew's procedural due process
rights. Id. at 600.
175. Colding, 344 U.S. at 596 n.5 (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945)).
176. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 745 (quoting Colding, 344 U.S. at 596). The requirement
that a returning resident alien's due process rights depend on the circumstances of his trip
abroad seems to contradict directly the Supreme Court's determination in Colding that any
alien who legally crosses the border is "invested" with due process rights. Colding, 344 U.S. at
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The district court then relied on Rosenberg v. Fleuti,7 7 finding
that the proper test for determining the due process rights of a perma-
nent resident alien returning to the United States is whether his trip
can be characterized as "innocent, casual, and brief." '178 This reliance
is misplaced, however, because the Supreme Court developed the
Fleuti test to establish whether such an alien should be subjected to
exclusion or deportation proceedings, 79 not to determine whether a
returning resident alien is entitled to any procedural due process
rights. In Fleuti, the Supreme Court reiterated its holding in Colding:
"[T]he returning resident alien is entitled as a matter of due process to
a hearing on the charges underlying any attempt to exclude him, a
holding which supports the general proposition that a resident alien
who leaves this country is to be regarded as retaining certain basic
rights.' 80
Moreover, the district court's decision seems impracticable
because an accurate determination of the circumstances of an alien's
departure requires a finding of fact involving more liberal procedural
due process than Section 1225(c) permits. The judiciary must pre-
serve procedural safeguards in order to protect the constitutional
rights of resident aliens and to insure national security by allowing the
courts to develop a full and truthful factual record.
4. APPLICANTS SUBJECT TO SECTION 901
Since its enactment, Section 901 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act (FRAA), 18' has been used by the judiciary to pro-
tect aliens from exclusion, under Sections 11 82(a)(27) and 11 82(a)(28)
based on their beliefs, associations, and speech, 182 without the neces-
sity of balancing interests or conducting in-depth personal inquir-
596 n.5. See also Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959) (holding that "[w]here
administrative action has raised serious constitutional problems, the Court has assumed that
Congress or the President intended to afford those affected by the action the traditional
safeguards of due process").
177. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
178. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 748 (quoting Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963)).
The Fleuti test requires that the court review both the duration and purpose of the trip. Fleuti,
374 U.S. at 462. The district court also interpreted Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206 (1953), as requiring the court to examine the circumstances of the departure, in
order to determine an alien's due process right. See Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 746. It would be
a cumbersome task, however, to look into the detailed circumstances of an alien's trip abroad,
when the alien has been summarily excluded and little or no factual record has been developed.
179. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 451-52.
180. Id. at 460.
181. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-
204, § 901, 101 Stat: 1331, 1339 (1987).
182. See id. at 1400.
IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION
ies."S  Under Section 901, the judiciary has begun to place on the
government the burden of showing that, in order to exclude an alien,
the alien poses a specific risk to national security, rather than a gen-
eral perceived threat arising from constitutionally protected divergent
ideas and political associations. 84 In order to provide the protection
intended by Congress in Section 901,185 however, the courts must read
the exceptions set forth in Section 901 very narrowly. 86
In Rafeedie, two exceptions to Section 901 were at issue.1 87 The
first exception excludes anyone who is a member, officer, representa-
tive, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),1 88
and the second excludes those who engage in "a terrorist activity or
[are] likely to engage after entry in a terrorist activity."'' 89 The dis-
trict court found this first exception to be applicable only to members
of the PLO and not to any of its affiliated groups.1 90 The district
court followed fundamental rules of statutory construction and rea-
soned that, because Congress included the allies and affiliates of the
PLO in other sections of the FRAA, but did not include them in Sec-
tion 901, Congress must have intended to leavethem out of that sec-
183. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 163.
184. See Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1120-21 (1st Cir. 1988).
185. For a description of the intent of Congress in Section 901, see CONFERENCE REPORT,
supra note 32, at 162-65.
186. The court in Lennon v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.
1975), stated:
It is settled doctrine that deportation statutes must be construed in favor of the
alien. "[S]ince the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume
that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by
the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used."
Id. at 193 (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
187. 688 F. Supp. 729, 751 (D.D.C. 1988). There are three exceptions to Section 901 which
allow the government to continue to exclude an alien who: 1) presents a natural security threat
determined on grounds other than belief, statement, or association that would be protected if
engaged in by a citizen; 2) is a terrorist or is likely to engage in terrorist activity; or 3)
represents, in an official capacity, a labor organization from a country where the organizations
are actually instruments of a totalitarian state. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 901, 101 Stat. 1331, 1400 (1987). The 1988
revision, limiting the application of Section 901 to nonimmigrant aliens, does not affect these
exceptions. 134 CONG. REC. S13,800 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1988).
188. Section 901(b) incorporates the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956,
section 21(c), 22 U.S.C. 2691(c) (1986), which provides for the exclusion of members of the
Palestine Liberation Organization.
189. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-
204, § 901(b)(2), 101 Stat. 1331, 1400 (1987).
190. See Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 753. The PLO has been the specific target of legislation
on several occasions, most notably in The Anti-Terrorist Act of 1987, which makes it illegal
for anyone to "establish or maintain an office, headquarters, premises, or other facilities or
establishments within the jurisdiction of the United States at the behest or direction of, or with
funds provided by the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups." 22
U.S.C. § 5202 (1987).
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tion."9 Therefore, because the government did not allege that
Rafeedie was a member of the PLO, the district court held this excep-
tion to be inapplicable. 92
As to the terrorist-activities exception, however, the court
defined an admittedly broad 93 category of those likely to engage in
terrorist activities.1 94 The court relied upon legislative intent to
include activities such as fundraising and recruiting as impermissible
activities which are not protected under Section 901(a). 95 Although
the government did not allege that Rafeedie was involved in organiz-
ing, abetting, or participating in terrorist activities, the court held that
there was a general issue of material fact regarding the nature of his
alleged participation in recruiting and fundraising activities for the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.1 96 The court acknowl-
edged that the alleged fundraising and recruitment efforts must be
intended to "facilitate terrorist activities, not just generally to further
the purposes of a terrorist organization."197 In addition, the court
acknowledged that, if these efforts can be characterized as "passive,
innocent, or in furtherance of advocacy or speech,"'98 they are pre-
sumably acceptable.
The difficulty, however, lies in the court's suggestion that the
burden may be on the alien to show that his activities are passive,
nonterrorist, and innocent, and that the alien has assumed the risk by
joining the organization. 99 In placing the burden of proof on the
alien, the court contravenes the policy underlying Section 901, which
places the burden of proof on the government to show a specific threat
in order to prevent exclusions based on anything less than that.200
191. See Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 752-53 ("[W]here Congress 'includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion
or exclusion.' ") (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 432 (1987)).
192. See id at 753.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id. The court recognized that Congress intended this as an activity-oriented rather
than a status-oriented exception. See id. See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972)
(holding that the government must show that the alien had a "specific intent to further [the
organization's] illegal aims").
198. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 753.
199. See id.
200. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 164.
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IV. CONCLUSION ...
Congress has attempted formally to revise the McCarran-Walter
Act to address national security needs, while also promoting the free
exchange of ideas and safeguarding constitutional principles. Success-
ful revision has yet to take place, largely because of the political
nature of the problems involved. The legislative debate has led only
to a temporary compromise, represented by the enactment of Section
901. The best solution the political process has been able to develop
so far is an extension of Section 901 through 1991.
It is essential that the judiciary assume the responsibility for nar-
rowly defining the groups of persons who can and should be excluded
from this country, and that these groups must first be shown to be a
direct threat to the security of the United States.2"1 If the courts fail
to set out clear constitutional guidelines for the Executive, the judici-
ary will have abdicated its proper role as the final arbiter of the
Constitution.
It has never been more clear that "[t]he First Amendment simply
cannot stand on the shifting foundation of ad hoc evaluations of spe-
cific threat."2 2 When the right involved is freedom of expression,
what might appear in one political context to be a reasonable restric-
tion might later be found unconstitutional.20 3 The consistent applica-
tion by the courts of a formal test based on a predetermined and
201. The necessity for the judicial and not the legislative or executive branch to define the
constitutional parameters of immigration law is premised on a traditional distinction between
the courts and legislatures: legislatures are products of political will and the courts are
ostensibly instruments of reason. See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional
Double Standards.- Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 246-47 (1973). Because the
politics of the person to be excluded is what is involved in so many of these cases, the relative
insulation from political pressures, which the judiciary can afford, is of particular importance.
202. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 109 (1980).
Ely further states:
Allowing people to assault our eardrums with outrageous and overdrawn
denunciations of institutions we treasure will inconvenience, annoy, and infuriate
us on occasion, even set us to wondering about the stability of our society: that's
exactly what such messages are meant to do, and exactly the price we shouldn't
think twice about paying. By silencing such people we may be protecting
something, but we certainly won't be protecting the "American way." In 1980
most people who have thought about the issue appreciate this. The hard part
will be to sustain that appreciation through our future periods of actual or
perceived crisis. Maybe we won't be able to, but we increase the chances by
using today to build protective barriers around free expression as secure as words
can make them.
Id. at 116.
203. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Brien, the Court refused to
classify the restriction placed on the symbolic burning of a draft card as content-based, and
therefore it was able to balance the right of the government with a merely incidental
infringement of the first amendment. Id. at 375.
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carefully defined set of unprotected activities is the best way to protect
fully the rights of noncitizens and to preserve the freedoms essential
to democracy.
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